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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
W E S T G A L L E R Y CORPORA T I O N , a Utah corporation, dba
GALLERY I THEATER, DON
W A L L S and L I N D A T O L L I V E R ,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
13963

SALT L A K E CITY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF T H E
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
Appellant appeals from an order of the
low granting respondents' motion to enjoin
from having a hearing without following its
inances and until the related criminal case
resolved.

court beappellant
own ordhad been

I
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D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT
Resposlents sought injunctive relief against appellant and obtained an order enjoining the hearing
appellant sought.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seeks the dismissal of the instant appeal or, in the alternative, the affirmance of the court's
order.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
On November 19, 1974, appellant caused to be
served a notice of violation against respondents for
showing an allegedly obscene movie, to wit: "Marriage
and Other Four Letter Words". (R.19) An Order to
Show Cause was issued by appellant on November 20,
1974, (R.18) requiring respondents to appear and show
cause why their business revenue and regulatory licenses
should not be revoked. Thereafter, on November 22,
1974, respondents sought and obtained a Temporary
Restraining Order restraining the hearing by appellant.
(R. 21, 31) On that date an Order to Show Cause was
set for December 2, 1974, requiring appellant to show
cause why it should not be enjoined from holding a
hearing. On December 2, 1974, respondents Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction pendente lite was granted.
(R. 34). That is reflected in the lower court's order
of December 17, 1974, (R. 35) from which this appeal
is sought.
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The Record on Appeal contains the Salt Lake
City Ordinance allegedly violated and the procedures
set up to revoke a license for violating an Ordinance.
(R. 5-17) The procedures set up by appellant for revoking a license are set forth in Section 20-20-18 et. seq.
(R. 12-17) Basically, an advisory council was set up
and that council was empowered to hold hearings and
make findings as to whether or not a violation of the
Ordinance had been committed. Those findings were
to be forwarded to appellant Commissioners who then
determined if a license should be revokel. (R. 13-15)
In this case the record reveals those procedures
were not followed. In fact, on January 14, 1975, those
procedures were repealed. (R. 39)
After the Order of December 17, 1974, (R. 35)
which, when carefully read, simply says that appellant
had to follow its ows ordinances in trying to revoke a
license, respondents stood trial in Salt Lake City Court
on a charge of violating a City Ordinance by showing
an allegedly obscene movie, "Marriage and Other Four
Letter Words''. The criminal charge was filed before
appellant's order to show cause. This is the same alleged conduct that resulted in appellant's original Order
to Show Cause. (R. 18-19) That trial resulted in a
verdict of not guilty as to respondent Walls and a dismissal of the case as to respondent Tolliver. (Exhibit
" B " , Affidavit) Therefore, the Salt Lake City Court
case referred to in the Order appealed from (R. 35, 36)
has been concluded, favorably to respondents.
3
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E INSTANT APPEAL SHOULD BE
D I S M I S S E D BECAUSE T H E R E A R E NO
ISSUES IN T H I S CASE AND T H E A P P E A L
I S MOOT.
I t is beyond dispute that this court will not decide
abstract or moot questions to esablish a precedent or to
guide future litigation. See e.g., Mikkelsen v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 22 Utah 2d 438, 455 P.2d 27
(1969).
I n this case any issue raised by the Order appealed
from (R. 35-36) is now moot because the Salt Lake
City Court criminal litigation has now terminated. The
Order itself refers in Paragraphs 2 and 3 to the criminal proceedings and simply says that no action can be
taken by appellant while the criminal case is pending.
I t is not now pending, and the Order of the court below has expired, and so this court has no issue facing it.
The issues in the Order do not now rest upon existing facts, and an event has occurred (conclusion of
the criminal case) which changes the Order in essence
and Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Order do not have any
effect.
I t is true that the injunction still needs toTbe dissolved but the dispute that brought the case here (can
appellant hold a hearing to see if respondents violated
4
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an Ordinance when the same question is pending in a
criminal case involving the same alleged perpetrators)
has ceased to exist. How could there be a question as
to that if there is now no criminal case? What decision
could this court render that would do more than guide
future litigation. If this court reversed the lower court
that would have no effect because appellant could not
now have a hearing while the other case is pending because it is not pending. To affirm the lower court would
also be an empty gesture because it would be to say the
appellant could not in the past have held a hearing
while a criminal case was pending. That would be a
guide to future litigation, but this court has often held
it does not hear and decide cases for that reason.
Further, the court's Order in Paragraph 1 said
that appellant must follow its own procedures, which
have since been repealed. (R. 39) This clearly makes
the issues of Paragraph 1 moot. See, e.g., Mikkelsen,
supra, for a case becoming moot "by reason of new
legislation, or by reason of the expiration or the superceding of existing litigation". 22 Utah 2d at 27.
Thus, as this court's decision would be no more
than an advisory opinion on moot issues, respondents
pray that the appeal be dismissed.
POINT II
T H E COURT B E L O W D I D NOT ACT
P R E M A T U R E L Y OR A B U S E I T S D I S C R E 5
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TION IN ORDERING APPELLANT
TO
ABIDE BY ITS OWN ORDINANCES AND
E N J O I N I N G A H E A R I N G TO D E T E R M I N E
T H E A L L E G E D OBSCENITY OF A F I L M
W H E N THAT IDENTICAL ISSUE WAS
P E N D I N G I N A C R I M I N A L CASE.
Appellant's brief seems to be couched in terms of
asking this court to overturn action of a lower court
which engaged in a raw abuse of power and interfered
with a municipal governing body's license revocation
powers totally without cause and in a setting of a
normal Kcense revocation hearing. This simply is not
such a case. The events of this case are completely
unique and must be examined in detail to see what
the court below actually ruled.
Salt Lake City enacted ordinances (R. 12-17)
which set forth in detail the procedures appellant Board
of Commissioners was to follow to determine whether
or not a license should be revoked or suspended because
of a violation of Section 20-20-18.1 of the ordinances.
(R. 12) I n this case those procedures were not followed
by appellant but instead appellant chose to have a hearing on its own initative to determine if a violation existed
and hence a license should be revoked. The court below
simply ruled appellant could not proceed in such a manner. The court below did not "interfere" with appellant
in its everyday practice of holding some sort of hearing.
The court below "interfered" with appellant by ruling
that it must follow the very procedures it enacted.
6
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Respondents contend that this factual background
entirely negates appellant's argument in Points I and
I I of its brief. The cases cited by appellant for the
proposition that the court abused its discretion are
simply not in point nor persuasive. For example, in
Aircraft and D. Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S.
752 (1947), which appellant cites for the proposition
that a court cannot take jurisdiction before a final
administrative act, the Supreme Cour was dealing with
a case where Congress had set up administrative procedures for the correction of abuses and so the court
could not hear the matter until those procedures had
been complied with. In Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 503 U.S. 41, cited by appellant, the Supreme
Court actually held as it did because the order of the
N.L.R.B. was unenforceable until said order had been
affirmed by the Circuit Court of appeals, and so an
action to enjoin the N.L.R.B. in federal district court
would not lie.
Appellant also cites an opinion of this court, Shelton v. Lees, 8 Utah 2d 88, 326 P.2d 386 (1958). That
case is not in point in the slightest. Shelton dealt only
with the statute, Utah Code Annotated, 58-22-19
(1953), which set forth what is to be reviewed and provided that the Department of Registration was to be
either affirmed or reversed on review by the district
court but a trial de novo was not to be held by the district court. Such a ruling by the court does not support appellant's position in this case.
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The lower court's ruling was based on the rationale
that appellant had to follow its own ordinances. The
ruling went on, however, to say that even if appellant
could deviate from its own orlinances it could not hold
a hearing during the pendency of a criminal case involving the same issue (obscenity or non-obscenity of a
movie entitled "Marriage and Other Four Letter
Words") and basically the same parties. (Salt Lake
City, a Municipal corporation, v. Don Walls, James
Piepenberg, and Linda Tolliver). The court's ruling
on this issue is correct because the issues involve First
Amendment claims.
Appellant cites cases dealing with liquor licenses,
child care homes, tax matters, food purveyors licenses,
anl so on. None of the cases deal with the issues of free
speech as does this case. That distinction is critical. The
United States Supreme Court has often dealt with procelures used by various governmental bodies in attempting to deal with allegedly pornographic materials and
their operation on protected free speech.
The starting point is Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1965). In that case Maryland had a rather
elaborate system dealing with the submission of movies
to a Board of Censors before a movie could be shown.
The film exhibitor did not submit the movie in question
and challenged the statutory scheme's constitutionality
on its face. The Maryland scheme fell short in several
areas. The exhibitor had the burden of instituting jud8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

icial proceedings persuading the court that material was
protected by the First Amendment. The second
infirmity was that the exhibition was barred until judicial review was completed. Thirdly, the scheme was
held to be invalid because it provided no assurance of
prompt judicial determination.
More recently and in light of Freedom the United
States Supreme Court struck down Chicago's censorship ordinance. In Tietel Film Corp v. Cusach, 360
U.S. 139 (1968), Chicago had an administrative procedure which, by its terms, could take from 50 to 57
days to complete before judicial proceedings could be
instituted. That was one reason for the invalidity of the
scheme under the dictates of Freedman. The court also
held the Chicago ordinances violative of the constitution
because there were no provisions for a prompt judicial
decision.
The above cases represent a much more specific
attempt at proper regulation than does the one in this
case. Here, there are absolutely no provisions existing
that appellant was to follow. At least in Cusack there
were some guidelines, even though invalid. Here, appellant on its own, not even following its own ordinances, just seemingly devised a system whereby it
ordered an order to show cause for responlents to
come in and show cause why their licenses should not
be revoked.
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Such a "scheme" magnifies each and every one of
the three evils that the Court struck down in Freedrnan.
First, the Court made it clear that the burden must rest
on the censor to prove the material is not protected, i.e.,
the censor must show the material obscene. I n this
case while there is no censor's board, the effect is the
same in that if the license was revoked that would
amount to a final restraint.
Secondly, if the license were revoked clearly no
showing of the material could exist while judicial review was sought. That exact feature was declared invalid in Freedrnan but at least there the ordinances
specified the exhibitor could seek judicial review. As
mentioned here, there is nothing setting forth any procedures to secure review and seemingly the exhibitor
is left to his own imagination as to how to secure judicial review.
The third failure of the ordinances Freedrnan and
Cusach decried was that there was no assurance of
prompt judicial review. I n Cusack times were specified
but they were too lengthy. This requirement exists so
that the decision of some board will not amount, in
practical effect, to a final restraint without a judicial
proceeding. Again, here there is no such procedure set
up. Seemingly, if the license was revoked, respondents
would somehow have to find their way through the local
courts in a time consuming procedure to see if a court
agreed with appellant's decision that the material was
not protected.
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Those evils are precisely what the Court in Freedman and Cusack held may not exist. Only after an
adversary judicial proceeding can a valid final restraint
exist. This "scheme" or impromptu procedure attempted by appellants illustrates the dangers the court ten
years ago sought to eliminate.
Appellant has suggested that respondents could
not get a court to interfere because maybe they would
have nothing to complain about because appellant may
not have revoked their license. Aside from real life
practicalities in this case that argument totally fails in
light of Freedman. There too, the exhibitor did not
know if his movie could have "passed" the censor's
board or not as he did not even submit it. The exhibitor
there went to court before the censor acted and got a
court to say, by declaratory judgment, the scheme was
invalid. Here respondents sought the same thing in
effect though via an injunction rather than declaratory
judgment. Therefore, the argument that respondent
was "premature" in going to court is totally rejected
in Freedman.
For these reasons respondents submit that the court
below was correct and that its judgment should be
affirmed.

U
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that the appeal is
moot, respondents respectfully submit that the appeal
should be dismissed. I n the alternative, for the reasons
above stated, the judgment and order of the court
below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
B R U C E C| L U B E C K
Attorney for Respondents
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